Modelling interdependences between spouses by estimating income satisfaction by Jose Alberto Molina et al.




Jose Alberto Molina María Navarro
University of Zaragoza and IZA FEDEA
Abstract
This paper models interdependences between spouses. To that end, it estimates income
satisfaction in a collective family model framework using a sample of seven EU countries.
The IV Hausman-Taylor estimator has been selected in the majority of countries, and it
appears that those of Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal and Spain) are the only countries
where both husbands’ and wives’ income satisfaction are significantly and positively affected
by their spouses’ wages and non-wage incomes, thus indicating a particular way of life
characterized by mutual cooperation and income sharing between spouses.
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1. Introduction 
On the basis that current research suggests that reported subjective well-being is a 
satisfactory empirical approximation of individual utility, that can be applied in socio-
economic research (Easterlin, 2002), the two areas of  general or life satisfaction that 
have mainly been the subject of economic analysis are those which study the positive 
relationship between this satisfaction and income (Easterlin, 2001; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2001), and that analyses the negative consequences on well-being of 
unemployment (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Di Tella et al., 2001).  
In addition to the study of this general or life satisfaction, one aspect of 
individual satisfaction that has been the subject of extensive analysis in the literature is 
income satisfaction. The evidence has shown that age, education or individual income 
appear to have significantly positive impacts on the income satisfaction of both 
spouses (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag, 2003; Schwarze, 2003). In this literature, 
the family, in the form of a marital status variable,  has traditionally been considered as 
a positive influence on the satisfaction level of its members (Clark and Oswald, 1994, 
2002). 
Despite the clear relevance of this evidence, income satisfaction has usually 
been studied without reflecting that the family is composed of interdependent spouses. 
Thus, the intuitive interrelations which can be assumed in reported satisfaction levels 
among members of the same family are overlooked. The following question then 
arises: how does one analyse the effects of one spouse’s level of satisfaction on that of 
the other in an integrated framework? Attempting to answer this question, we model 
the interdependences of individual preferences within the household by assuming the 
collective approach, in which one spouse’s satisfaction not only depends on his/her 
own determinants, but also on the other spouse’s variables (Chiappori, 1988, 1992). 
This makes it possible to derive stochastic formulations estimated for seven 
representative EU countries, using the panel structure of the eight waves of the 
European Community Household Panel-ECHP (1994-2001). 
 
2. The data and the model 
Families from the ECHP (1994-2001)  have been selected in which both spouses are 
aged between 16 and 65.
 1  Individuals both with and without children have been 
included in these households. Those families lacking the required information have 
been excluded, resulting in a total sample ranging from 33,764 households in Spain to 
6,236 households in Finland. The ECHP enquires into the income satisfaction level of 
individuals by asking: “How satisfied are you with your present financial situation?”. 
Each of these responses takes values from 1 to 6, moving from not satisfied at all (1) to 
completely satisfied (6).   
Our dependent variables are husband and wife income satisfaction (HusbSatisf, 
WifeSatisf), whereas the exogenous variables include a number of individual 
characteristics and, secondly, several economic variables. These include the age of the 
spouses (HusbAge, WifeAge), the age difference between them (AgeDifference), the 
education level (HusbPrimEduc, HusbSeconEduc, HusbHighEduc, WifePrimEduc, 
WifeSeconEduc, WifeHighEduc), as well as two other variables which refer to the 
presence of children in the household: a dummy variable indicating if there is a child 
under 12 in the family (Children<12), and another indicating the number of children 
under 16 (Children<16). As regards the variables of the economic situation of the 
                                                 
1 The ECHP is an extensive, sample-based panel survey in which the same households and individuals 
are interviewed annually. The data come from a standardised questionnaire and are designed to be cross-
nationally comparable (Peracchi, 2002).   2
household, these include the wages of both spouses (HusbWage, WifeWage), as well as 
the annual non-wage incomes (HusbNon-WageInc, WifeNon-WageInc), the wife’s 
participation in the family income (WifeParticipation) and, finally, the study includes a 
variable indicating whether the individual is self-employed or a wage-earner 
(HusbSelf-Employed, WifeSelf-Employed, HusbWage-Earner, WifeWage-Earner). 
The model adopts the family collective approach, based on the assumption that 
intra-household decisions are Pareto-efficient, considering that the household consists 
of two working-age individuals, A = husband and B = wife, whose rational preferences 
could be represented by indirect utility functions defined on their own vectors of 
wages and non-labour incomes, as well as on the other member’s vector. It should also 
be noted that the panel data structure of the ECHP permits the application of 
techniques to control for unobservable heterogeneity. On these theoretical and 
empirical bases, the stochastic formulation underlying the observed subjective well-
being responses takes the form of linear functions: 
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where the parameters β and δ are the coefficients of the variables; µ and α are constant 
terms, with µ being  the average population and α the individual deviation with respect 
to this average; and, finally, e   are the error terms, with null mean and constant 
variance.
2 These equations are estimated independently for both spouses, in such a 
way that N is the number of families in the sample.   
The estimation of family members’ satisfaction requires that individual 
unobservable utility be measured, with a common approach having been to use ordinal 
well-being variables. One concern is that some people look at life either 
pessimistically or optimistically, even though there is “really” no difference in their 
level of well-being, with this potential bias being largely overcome by controlling for 
individual effects (Clark and Oswald, 2002; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). 
Moreover, as individuals’ behaviour is orientated towards achieving higher satisfaction 
levels, the chosen variables will be endogenous, with a standard solution to this bias 
being to use instrumental variables (Schwarze, 2004).  
Taking into account these stochastic circumstances, we develop an estimation strategy 
consisting of four consecutive estimations, namely pool, fixed effects, random effects, 
and efficient generalized instrumental variables as proposed by Hausman and Taylor 
(1981). After estimating the four alternative specifications, some appropriate tests 
allow us to select the best formulation. An LM test indicates if a panel or a pool 
estimation is preferred. If a panel estimation is selected, then a choice must be made 
among the three alternative specifications, with two Hausman tests allowing the best 
panel estimation to be selected. The first Hausman test (Hausman-1) is the standard to 
distinguish between the random and fixed effects estimators, whereas the second 
(Hausman-2) tests the Hausman-Taylor against the fixed effects model.
3 
                                                 
2 Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable on individual satisfaction, an appropriate regression 
model would be an ordered probit. However, whilst random-effects ordered probit model is available in 
standard statistical software packages (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag, 2003; Schwarze, 2004; 
Winkelmann, 2005; Schwarze and Winkelmann, 2005), the fixed-effects ordered probit estimator is not. 
This is the reason why the present paper uses as approximations both random-effects and fixed-effects 
regression models, which are perfectly comparable by using habitual tests (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters, 2004; Graham et al., 2004). 
3 The 8.0 version of Stata includes the Hausman-Taylor procedure and is used to obtain the estimates 
presented in this paper   3
 
3. Empirical results 
Starting with the test results, Table 1 shows that, for the majority of cases, the 
Hausman-Taylor estimation is the selected method. The same Table shows that the 
effect of age is significantly positive in the majority of countries. Moreover, when the 
age difference between spouses is greater, female income satisfaction rises in Spain 
and the United Kingdom. The effects of the presence of children vary across countries, 
and also depending on age. If the child is younger than 12, the effect is positive for 
males, but negative in Denmark, France and Italy for females. As the number of 
children under 16 living at home rises, satisfaction falls in Greece, Spain and the 
United Kingdom for both male and female sub-samples. The education variables show 
that income satisfaction significantly increases when husbands and wives achieve 
higher education qualifications. 
(Table 1) 
With respect to the economic variables, increases in the individual’s wage has a 
highly significant positive impact on both male and female satisfaction for all sample 
EU countries. Male satisfaction also positively depends on female wages in Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Moreover, for all sample countries, 
the wife’s income satisfaction increases as the husband’s wage increases.  
With respect to non-wage incomes, the positive cross-effect on female 
satisfaction appears in Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, whereas the 
normality hypothesis is satisfied in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Moreover, the 
husband’s variable has a positive effect on male income satisfaction in Denmark, 
France, Greece, Portugal and Spain. This positive effect also appears from the wife’s 
non-wage income in Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain.  
Moreover, increases in the wife’s share of family income raises the husband’s 
income satisfaction in Spain, but lowers it in Greece and Portugal. An increase in the 
wife’s share of family income is seen to raise female income satisfaction in Italy and 
Spain. The self-employment variable has a significantly negative impact on the male 
variable in Greece, and on the female variable in Finland, France and Greece. 
In summary, strong evidence has been adduced in support of the interrelations 
between spouses, with asymmetric behaviour being identified between husbands and 
wives. Specifically, the Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) are 
the only sample members where both spouses could be interpreted as “altruistic”, in 
the sense that both male and female satisfaction variables are significantly and 
positively affected by the spouses’ wage and non-wage income. This result indicates a 
pattern of family life characterized by mutual and strong cooperation and income 
sharing between the spouses. Thus, these countries are clear examples where 
cooperative models of family behaviour are fully justified to represent the 
interrelations between spouses. 
An understanding of individual satisfaction derived from income within the 
family could be particularly useful for policy-makers in evaluating socio-economic 
policies. Our conclusions will assist in the drafting of policies aimed at increasing 
spouses’ satisfaction levels. In addition to policies focused on improving the education 
level of individuals, as well as their incomes, our finding that wives in particular 
exhibit altruistic behaviour has a bearing on policies directed towards increasing male 
incomes and thus having a greater impact on the family as a whole.   4
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Table 1. Income satisfaction 
 Denmark  Finland  France  Greece  Portugal Spain  United  Kingdom 
Variables  Male Female Male  Male  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
4.614** 4.449** 1.426** 1.928** 2.110** 3.690** 2.059** 2.614** 2.683** 2.377** 0.974** 1.639** 3.391** 2.478**  Constant 
(6.42) (14.36) (2.87)  (3.79) (11.20)  (11.33)  (15.61)  (41.69)  (48.02)  (33.10) (7.28) (15.35) (9.50)  (9.28) 
0.009** 0.011** 0.023** 0.021** 0.027**  0.001  0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.027** 0.018** 0.006** 0.015**  HusbAge  (3.73) (3.90) (5.11) (4.53)  (16.83)  (0.15) (3.42) (2.31) (3.43) (4.07)  (19.57)  (12.44)  (2.18) (5.02) 
-0.008  0.004  0.001  0.018*  -0.018**   -0.019*     0.005  -0.003  0.015**  -0.015**  0.012**  Age Difference  (-0.66) (0.42) (0.10) (1.68) (-3.51)    (-1.91)      (1.01) (-0.57) (2.36) (-2.12) (2.44) 
-0.059**  -0.102** -0.050  -0.074 -0.052** -0.066* 0.057** 0.055**  -0.019  0.003  0.098** 0.056** 0.063**  -0.044  Children < 12  (-2.00)  (-3.24)  (-1.02)  (-1.48)  (-2.53)  (-1.77) (2.54) (2.42) (-1.06) (0.19) (4.49) (2.46) (2.29) (-1.46) 
-0.124** -0.077**  -0.000  0.002  0.061**  -0.011  -0.060** -0.063**  -0.002  -0.009  -0.102** -0.055** -0.087** -0.090**  Children< 16  (-6.10) (-3.54) (-0.01) (0.05)  (4.22) (-0.22) (-3.95) (-4.17) (-0.17) (-0.71) (-6.59) (-3.40) (-3.17) (-3.10) 
-2.033  1.528** 1.410** 2.054** -1.591**    -0.259      6.372**  1.240  4.693** -3.138** 2.513**  HusbSeconEduc  (-1.57)  (3.22)  (2.00)  (3.69)  (-2.68)  (-0.48)    (8.01)  (1.48)  (10.41)  (-3.32)  (9.16) 
1.104  -2.281** 2.968**  1.131*  2.595**    6.500**      -1.457** 3.868** -1.915** 2.555**  -1.011  HusbHighEduc  (1.02) (-4.15) (3.41) (1.73) (7.36)    (6.26)      (-2.14) (8.68) (-2.33) (6.47) (-1.46) 
-0.781 -0.811 -1.213 -0.627  1.240**    -4.467**      -0.204  -1.787**  -1.261**  -0.510 -0.135  WifeHighEduc  (-0.95) (-1.52) (-1.59) (-1.11) (2.97)    (-4.48)      (-0.24) (-4.61) (-3.54) (-1.43) (-0.48) 
0.108** 0.056** 0.102** 0.078** 0.039** 0.062** 0.068** 0.040** 0.057** 0.029** 0.077** 0.061** 0.103** 0.108**  HusbWage  (12.87)  (6.31) (2.81) (2.06) (8.30) (3.14)  (18.11)  (11.52)  (17.51)  (9.13)  (20.71)  (16.06)  (6.02) (5.98) 
0.020** 0.078** 0.070** 0.067** 0.012** 0.083** 0.027** 0.034** 0.015** 0.039** 0.024** 0.033**  -0.002  0.050**  WifeWage  (2.64) (9.67) (2.59) (2.38) (2.30) (4.45) (6.21) (7.12) (4.10)  (10.93)  (5.07) (6.69) (-0.14) (2.82) 
0.438*  -0.262  0.398  0.495*  0.481**  -1.395  0.091** 0.070** 0.060** 0.041** 0.065** 0.057**  3.720  3.677  HusbNon-WageInc  (1.67) (-0.94) (1.49) (1.80) (2.47) (-1.12)  (12.07)  (9.20) (5.83) (4.00) (6.72) (5.55) (1.27) (1.25) 
1.104**  0.664*  0.010  -0.296  -0.386  1.433  0.071** 0.048** 0.073** 0.079** 0.104** 0.081**  3.257  0.324  WifeNon-WageInc  (3.29) (1.86) (0.02) (-0.65)  (-1.15) (0.51) (4.60) (3.11) (3.48) (3.81) (3.22) (2.38) (0.67) (0.06) 
-0.013 -0.097 -0.209 0.013 -0.045 -0.022  -0.171**  0.068  -0.084**  0.030  0.117**  0.246**  0.006 0.051  WifeParticipation  (-0.14)  (-0.95)  (-0.95) (0.06) (-0.81)  (-0.18)  (-3.42) (1.35) (-2.12) (0.75) (2.12) (4.24) (0.08) (0.55) 
-0.274**  0.031 -0.024  -0.299**  0.015 -0.023  -0.045*  -0.114**  0.016 0.005  0.078**  -0.062 0.065 0.004  HusbSelf-Employed  (-5.05) (0.44) (-0.42) (-3.94) (0.34) (-0.17) (-1.74) (-3.22) (0.82) (0.23) (2.57) (-1.50) (1.46) (0.06) 
         
4,923.67 4,317.63 1,774.92 1,638.12  17,036.62  1,787.88 6,133.27 6,286.51  13,890.03  16,166.02  7,825.20 8,706.36 2,928.44 2,534.99  LM  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
129.59 124.69  62.89  59.27  619.40 186.34 653.27 613.39 499.27 359.04 753.30 603.36 314.91 230.08  Hausman 1  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
7.58  9.32  2.90  1.99  0.76  17.81 16.55 29.53 17.16 12.33 12.98  1.58  4.97  2.24  Hausman 2  (0.577)  (0.4082) (0.9683) (0.9916) (0.9998) (0.0374) (0.0562) (0.0005) (0.0463) (0.1955) (0.1636) (0.9965) (0.8367) (0.9871) 
         
Selected  estimation  HT HT HT HT HT FE HT FE FE HT HT HT HT HT 
         
Number of 
observations  12,083  6,236  31,083 27,817 28,803 33,764 14,612 
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level 